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The nature of conflict is changing. Today Iraq and Syria stand as 
a measure of the difficulties of post-conflict recovery. A central 
problem, there and elsewhere, is explosive threats contaminating 
the environment during and after conflict. To mitigate this threat to a 
society’s recovery, the sector of “Mine Action” emerged over 30 years 
ago. However, the sector’s policy and practices are coming under 
renewed strain from contemporary conflict trends of urbanisation 
and non-state armed groups’ use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). 
This Strategic Update focuses on the sheer difficulty of helping post-
conflict communities in Iraq. Its main case study will be the plight 
of Mosul, Iraq’s second city, which—more than two years since 
its liberation from Daesh—is still estimated to have over 300,000 
residents living in camps unable to return to their former homes.1 
The article remains relevant for the future of Syria, Libya, Yemen, 
Afghanistan and other countries where Daesh and other non-state 
armed groups have used IEDs both as a weapon of choice and as a 
way of creating post-conflict instability.
Today, there is a fundamental question facing Mine Action: Does this 
complex challenge, of improvised devices and urban environments, 
necessitate a fundamental re-think in the policy and practice of Mine 
Action programming?  
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BACKGROUND
Through its five UN-mandated pillars of 
activity,2 Mine Action’s role is to ensure 
humanitarian assistance, reinforce peace 
and security, and act as a catalyst for 
sustainable development.3 At inception in 
1989, its task seemed insurmountable. 
Not only was the prospect of eliminating 
landmines as a global threat deemed 
unachievable, but the political and 
organisational landscape for doing so was 
totally uncharted.4 
There were nearly 100 million unexploded 
landmines deployed in more than 60 
countries around the world, with Cambodia, 
Angola and Afghanistan the worst affected. 
The vast majority were anti-personnel 
landmines produced by licensed arms 
companies. Circa 8,000 individuals fell 
victim each year, of whom half were killed.5
Despite that challenging context, the creation 
of Mine Action helped build the momentum 
that led to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) and the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM),6 
alongside the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS). Together, these have 
served as a strategic and operational 
framework to promote a common and 
consistent approach to demining efforts.7 
That progress has been accompanied by 
concrete achievements on the ground, with 
the trade in anti-personnel mines grinding 
to a near halt, and a reported 53 million 
landmines destroyed by signatory states. 
Mine Action has also successfully widened 
its scope incrementally to focus not just 
on landmines, but also on other explosive 
hazards and remnants of war.8 This is 
consistent with the mission of meeting 
the needs created by the evolving nature 
of conflict. 
Mine Action has gradually shifted its 
emphasis from meeting the basic 
security needs of the civilian population 
and humanitarian workers (i.e. enabling 
short-term relief and promoting safety), 
to ensuring developmental outcomes 
supporting structural advancement such as 
access to services. Mine Action therefore 
enables not just survival, but also recovery 
from conflict.9 Figure 1 illustrates the stages 
of Mine Action interventions overlapping 
and moving from a focus on humanitarian 
relief to development.10 
 
THE IMPACT OF IMPROVISED  
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDS)
Since the rise of Daesh in 2014, a new era 
of IEDs represents a significant challenge 
to the progress achieved by Mine Action. 
From 1999, when the APMBC came into 
force, to 2011, the number of annual 
landmine victims dropped by a half from 
8,800 to 4,300 by 2011.11 However, by 2016, 
this number rose back to more than 8,000 
(42% of them children), with nearly 2,100 
killed.12 IEDs overtook conventional anti-
personnel mines by some distance as the 
leading cause of these casualties.13
This threat is not new but the use of IEDs 
has proliferated and diversified, becoming 
more urbanised and more explicitly 
targeted at civilians. These factors have 
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Figure 1. Mine Action Stages (GICHD 2014)
severely increased the challenges for 
those tasked with clearing IEDs and 
has made it much harder for Mine 
Action to focus on its enablement of 
development goals in terms of the repair of 
infrastructure and rehabilitation of homes 
in a timely manner.14
Previously, Mine Action operations 
were largely focused on removing 
conventional mines produced by 
established arms companies with well-
known disposal procedures. Technical 
skills for conventional mines could be 
taught to local operators by experienced 
personnel in a matter of weeks. However, 
clearing IED–which have countless more 
variations than industrially manufactured 
weapons (e.g. different construction and 
employment which may further change 
over time to target response tactics)—is 
far more complex and requires personnel 
with skills that are harder to find and take 
longer to develop. Guy Rhodes, the former 
Director of Operations at the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining, points out:
“In such theatres, operators have to 
review skill sets of their field staff, 
and national authorities are under 
pressure to scrutinize accreditation 
procedures of organizations under 
their responsibility. Furthermore, 
donors consider value for money  
from a wide variety of proposals and 
look to issue grants and contracts 
with appropriate reference to 
international norms.”15
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Adaptation to this new reality is also not helped 
by the somewhat semantic debates about the 
definitional and technical differences between 
conventional mines and IEDs. Yes, reinforcing 
the normative frameworks of the sector is 
essential, but the more important debate is 
whether the existing operational frameworks 
and skillsets established for mines are still 
fit for purpose with IEDs. This is an issue 
clearly seen when looking at the example 
of Iraq.
 
MINE ACTION AND IRAQ
The situation in Iraq is particularly relevant 
because it illustrates how the linear nature 
of recovery displayed in Figure 1 above does 
not always reflect the complexities on the 
ground—not least because of the challenges 
presented by IEDs. Today, operators must deal 
with different ‘stages’ of recovery concurrently, 
facing different challenges in different parts of 
the same governate or even in the same town. 
For example, despite the defeat of Daesh 
in Iraq over two years ago, the country’s 
second city, Mosul, remains a ‘three-
dimensional minefield with the dangers of war 
still present everywhere’.17 
During the years of its putative caliphate, 
Daesh produced improvised munitions on 
a  near industrial scale.18 They left behind 
IEDs in Iraqi homes, schools, hospitals and 
elsewhere, specifically designed to target 
civilians returning to their old towns and 
cities, in order to prolong insecurity and delay 
economic redevelopment. 
Figure 2. Author witnessing the destruction in 
Mosul first-hand in 2017 at the Great Mosque of 
al-Nuri destroyed by ISIS © Dave Luke
The concern regarding donor motivation is 
certainly not a new one in the humanitarian 
sphere. This factor was highlighted in the 
UN-commissioned review of the Kosovo 
Mine Action operation in 1997: ‘In any 
peace-building operation, Mine Action 
should not be a discretionary activity left 
to the charitable impulses of the donor 
community’.16 Funding bodies have long 
been criticised for favouring quick, easy 
results over long-term, more complex 
tasks. It is especially concerning if work 
on IEDs is competing for funds with the 
clearance of conventional mines as the 
work effort and resources required are 
very different. 
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Again, improvised explosive threats in post-
conflict zones are not a new threat, with 
Afghanistan and Chechnya in the 1990s 
being heartfelt examples. However, the 
scale, urban environment and targeting 
of civilians today is a combination that 
is fundamentally different. This has 
forced Mine Action to confront two major 
questions: First, how should it adapt its 
operational practices on the ground? 
Second, how should it adapt its policies and 
doctrine to meet this new challenge?
 
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES
Even during the most intense periods of 
conflict against Daesh in Iraq, there was 
little optimism about what would come 
during the recovery period. In 2016, US State 
Department representative Jerry Guilbert 
warned of the challenges and complexities 
to follow: 
“Disposal teams and civilians will 
be fighting the last vestiges of the 
caliphate long after it collapses. You 
have to treat every item you see as if 
it’s an IED until you prove it’s not, so 
that necessarily makes the pace of 
work go a lot slower”.19
Additional challenges lie in co-ordination 
and prioritisation. As with every post-
conflict or humanitarian crisis situation, 
where a plethora of agencies, donors, 
commercial organisations and state actors 
occupy a congested physical and political 
space, Mine Action’s work in Iraq has been 
impeded by overlapping responsibilities and 
competing agendas.
Mine Action derives its tasks in Iraq from 
two primary sources: the UN Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) and the Iraqi Directorate of 
Mine Action. Their priorities and resourcing 
decisions are in turn affected by a wide 
variety of political and practical requests 
from various international, national and local 
authorities. In theory, consistent with Mine 
Action’s mission, those priorities should be 
determined by an objective assessment of 
where the greatest humanitarian need lies. 
However, assessments of priorities are 
rarely objective in an Iraqi political system 
that is consistently dogged by the patronage 
of particular regions, religious sects 
and local leaders. What exacerbates the 
problems of prioritisation and inter-agency 
coordination in Iraq is the more complex, 
urbanised and improvised nature of the 
threats Mine Action are tackling. In this 
already challenging environment, technical 
frictions over where to start the response 
and what to prioritise–even within a single 
city like Mosul–do not just breed delay and 
indecision, but distrust amongst the local 
population for Mine Action responders and 
the local authorities.
Ongoing work in the Geneva International 
Centre of Humanitarian Demining 
proposes that the growing diversity of 
improvised threats in urban environments, 
like Iraq, requires a new mechanism for 
risk and ‘mission analysis’. In their view, 
this mechanism ought to be based on 
principles, judgment and organisational 
risk thresholds, rather than relying solely 
on the tightly followed and standardised 
operational protocols which the sector has 
developed over decades. 
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On a crucial practical level, they are clearly 
right. At the beginning of the conflict 
response, much of the Mine Action work 
was carried out by commercial companies 
funded by UN Mine Action Service and 
the US Department of State. Mine Action 
agencies were chiefly staffed by Iraqi 
national staff supported by a relatively high 
ratio of international personnel, largely with 
extensive experience in dealing with IEDs 
from prior military careers. As NGOs took 
more responsibilities, they also required 
a large influx of similar, mostly ex-military 
experts to support the capacity development 
of national staff in the clearance of IEDs. 
While Mine Action has always had a flow of 
ex-military personnel, the pace and quantity 
required due to IED contamination have 
increased in recent years.  At times this has 
caused some frictions with existing staff 
that have built up considerable experience 
in conventional mine clearance. It has taken 
time for the two perspectives to mix in 
what were crisis response conditions. But 
undoubtedly there is now a closer technical 
and cultural alignment where technical IED 
staff new to Mine Action have learned the 
humanitarian principles and objectives 
underpinning Mine Action’s work, and the 
staff with more conventional Mine Action 
experience have come to appreciate the 
experience these new additions have 
brought in tackling the IED threat at scale 
and in urban areas. In this way, the proposal 
of the Geneva International Centre of 
Humanitarian Demining—a new mechanism 
of principles, judgment, and risk thresholds— 
is a consolidated account of what has 
already, organically begun in response 
programming to replace the procedures of 
the past, found to be too rigid.
Mine Action agencies are also now seeing 
their slower-burning, internal capacity 
development programmes catch up, develop 
their operators with sufficient knowledge 
and skills to face the challenge from IEDs. 
However, it is still widely acknowledged that 
clearing IEDs from urban areas so they can 
be re-populated is the least mature skillset 
of the sector, yet the most complex issue 
still to be faced. The operational guidance 
set out in the IMAS has also been updated 
for IED Disposal and Building Clearance; 
however, this was substantially delayed due 
to debates over technical and definitional 
issues, as well as differing cultural positions 
amongst stakeholders and contributors. 
This was such a drawn-out process that 
an appraisal into the policy review board 
process has recently been commissioned by 
the UN. 
In mitigation, it is obvious that incentivising 
and delivering change must be based on 
evidence of threat and priorities. For Iraq, 
there was legitimate concern initially–in the 
absence of accurate data and subsequent 
analysis–that decisions for funding and 
tasking risked being made on the basis 
of ‘expert opinion’ only. Nevertheless, the 
fact that those positions would need to 
be brought closer together, and much 
more quickly, should have been forecast 
and potentially mitigated. This could 
be achieved, for example, with more 
impartiality in the decision-making bodies 
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and certainly without the confusion created 
for donors who were hearing differing 
funding bids regarding proposed priorities 
and operational objectives. Only now is 
there growing factual evidence available 
to help classify explosive threats, as will 
be made clearer through advances in 
information management such as IMSMA, 
the Information Management System 
for Mine Action,20 and a forthcoming UN-
authored “Lethality Index”. Collating this 
type of evidence should help inform both 
the prioritisation of efforts and funding 
allocations in the future, in Iraq and beyond, 
now that sufficient information is available 
to test and support expert opinions. 
 
POLICIES AND DOCTRINE
While the adaptation of operational 
practices to the challenges of IEDs from 
Daesh in Iraq has been a difficult and 
protracted process, it should influence and 
speed up the response to similar challenges 
left behind by armed groups in other 
conflict zones. However, still unresolved is 
the debate in how Mine Action should adapt 
its policies and doctrine to reflect this shift.
It has been clear for decades that recovery 
from modern types of conflict will require 
more comprehensive solutions than the 
simple provision of humanitarian relief.21 
However, while there is a clear need 
to integrate a range of humanitarian, 
developmental, political, security, and 
reconciliation objectives into recovery, the 
example of Iraq illustrates how difficult it is 
to do so successfully. The problems being 
encountered by Mine Action in trying to 
develop a properly integrated strategy in 
Iraq are therefore far from unique, albeit– 
as noted above–they are also exacerbated 
by Mine Action drawing its funding from 
a number of external donors with diverse 
relief goals and political priorities.22 These 
challenges make it even more difficult for 
Mine Action agencies in Iraq to adapt to 
changing needs, maintain political neutrality, 
and ensure coherent messaging about 
their mission. 
Again, the tactics of Daesh, in particular the 
use of IEDs in urban areas, have created 
a real difficulty for Mine Action to define 
and maintain a wide enough and more 
predictable ‘humanitarian space’23 in which 
to conduct their operations. This concern 
has led the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining to call for ‘a 
requirement to systematise the evaluation 
contexts to ensure focus on humanitarian 
objectives and to uphold humanitarian 
principles.’24 This is not a new requirement, 
with conflict responses as far back as 
Afghanistan and the Balkans in the 1980s 
raising similar concerns about whether 
the demining agencies working there 
had a sufficient technical and contextual 
understanding of the situation they were 
operating in to ensure the establishment 
of an effective and principled humanitarian 
plan. However, those concerns are hugely 
increased in Iraq given the new nature 
and sheer scale of Daesh’s IED legacy. 
As a result, they have led to a debate 
about whether demining policymakers 
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Figure 3. Mosul’s 3D Mine-field. © Dave Luke 2017
should endeavour to apply and adapt the 
established Mine Action framework of 
conventions and treaties to this challenge 
or consider IEDs as a separate issue and 
develop bespoke associated policy tools.
The International Committee of the Red 
Cross, among others, have argued for 
keeping the policy response to IEDs within 
the scope of the current treaties. This is in 
order to provide ongoing clarity to States 
Parties for the fulfilment of their ‘obligations’ 
in relation to reporting and clearing 
explosively contaminated areas and 
providing mine risk education.25 However, 
IEDs have also been the subject of annual 
UN resolutions since December 2015 (UN 
70/46), calling for the development of 
more effective and specific strategies to 
tackle the problem which acknowledges 
the change in complexity. This widening of 
the policy space includes another related 
issue with the growth in intelligence and 
military-led Counter-IED activities in Iraq 
and beyond, including the targeting of the 
networks behind them.26 The mixing or 
overlapping of Mine Action and Counter-
IED activities is a well-voiced fear in this 
sector as it risks severely blurring the lines 
between security, military and humanitarian 
objectives. Hannah Bryce of Chatham 
House suggests this policy ambiguity is 
primarily why responses to IEDs have been 
so fragmented.27 
It can be argued that, twenty years after the 
APMBC came into effect, the shift towards 
IEDs is a measure of its success given that 
non-state armed groups have not been able 
to access as many conventional munitions.28 
Thus it would also be a natural evolution for 
the current convention to switch focus to 
the new threat. Nevertheless, how to ‘re-
think’ or update the normative frameworks 
in a timely manner remains up for debate.
 
CONCLUSION
Humanitarian responses in conflict 
situations are growing more difficult, less 
predictable and increasingly non-linear. Iraq 
illustrates this problem, given the scale and 
complexity of the challenge posed by the 
IEDs left behind in urban environments, 
specifically to prevent the return of civilians 
and the recovery of cities like Mosul.
Not for the first time, Mine Action is 
therefore having to wrestle with how to 
define and maintain a ‘humanitarian space’ 
for its work, whether its current policy tools 
are applicable, and at a practical level, 
whether it has the operational expertise to 
meet the challenge. 
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Similar issues can and have been overcome by Mine 
Action in the past, but the real challenge in future conflict 
response lies in understanding and rising to the uncertainty 
and intensity posed by these improvised threats in urban 
conditions. Dealing with this complexity–rather than 
developing some new version of Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention–is arguably the paradigm shift in policy 
and operational practice most urgently required. This 
will particularly prove to be the case once Libya, Syria, 
Afghanistan and Yemen move into a post-conflict phase. 
As Mine Action has learned in Iraq, standardised 
solutions and existing policy tools are not working quickly 
enough. Future responses must therefore be based on 
principles and local contextual understanding rather 
than past templates, and responses should be resourced 
by a suitably trained and experienced workforce of 
international expert mentors (from a mix of military, 
commercial and humanitarian backgrounds) growing 
a sustainable local capacity from the start even during 
crises response phases.
Donors and institutions must also be educated about the 
nature and scale of this new challenge, and they must 
agree to relinquish control and reduce their expectations 
of predictable or immediate results. It is an unfortunate 
but inevitable fact that the future of post-conflict 
recovery holds a tremendous amount of complexity 
and uncertainty. Traditional methods of explosive threat 
mitigation and traditional measures of such success 
have, unfortunately, become too simplistic for our present 
circumstances.
Mine Action has responded, if incrementally, to these 
new challenges, and the lessons it has learned will 
benefit efforts in future conflict response. The only 
question now is whether there has been sufficient 
change to ensure the sector is ready to respond, 
in a timely manner, to the urban and improvised trends 
which are the new nature of conflict. 
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The nature of conflict is changing. Mine Action’s 
policy and practices are therefore coming under 
strain from the contemporary conflict trends 
of urbanisation and non-state armed groups 
(NSAG) using improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). This Strategic Update considers if there 
is a paradigm shift underway or if the current 
frictions are growth pains for this generation of 
humanitarian responders.
Old Issues–New Threats  
Mine Action and IEDs in  
Urban Environments
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